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Abstract
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk manage-
ment of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions.
This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk
management based on a game-theoretic approach. The risk manager acts
as a mechanism designer providing rules and incentive factors such as
assistance or subsidies to divisions or units, which are modeled as self-
ish players of a strategic (noncooperative) game. Based on this model,
incentive mechanisms with various objectives are developed that satisfy
efficiency, preference-compatibility, and strategy-proofness criteria. In ad-
dition, iterative and distributed algorithms are presented, which can be
implemented under information limitations such as the risk manager not
knowing the individual units’ preferences. An example scenario illustrates
the framework and results numerically. The incentive mechanism design
approach presented is useful for not only deriving guidelines but also de-
veloping computer-assistance systems for large-scale risk management.
Keywords: mechanism design, risk management, incentives in orga-
nizations
1 Introduction
Security risk management is a multi-disciplinary field with both technical and
organizational dimensions. On the technical side, complex and networked
systems play an increasingly important role in daily business processes. Hence,
system failures and security problems have direct consequences for organizations
both monetarily and in terms of productivity [29]. It is therefore a necessity for
any modern organization to develop and deploy technical solutions for improving
robustness of these complex information technology (IT) systems with respect to
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failures (e.g. in the form of redundancies) and defending them against security
threats (e.g. firewalls and intrusion detection/response systems).
However, even the best and most suitable technical solution will fail to per-
form adequately if it is not properly deployed and supported organizationally.
In order to be successful in risk management, an organization has to have proper
information about its business processes and complex technical systems or “ob-
serve” them as well as be able to influence their operation or “control” them [2].
In a large-scale organization these two necessary requirements, which may seem
easy to satisfy at first glance, pose significant challenges. An important reason
behind this issue, beside organizational structure, is the underlying incentive
mechanisms.
Autonomous yet interdependent divisions or units of a large organization
have often individual objectives and incentives that may not be as aligned
in practice as the headquarters and executives wish. Each such unit may have
a different perspective on risk management which directly affects deployment of
technical or organizational solutions. Misaligned incentives also make observa-
tion and control of business and technical processes difficult for risk managers.
Considering the complex interdependencies in today’s technology and business,
such a misalignment in incentives is not a luxury even a large-scale organization
can effort.
Let us consider an example scenario of an enterprise deploying a new secu-
rity risk management system that entails information collection (observation),
risk assessment (decision making), and mitigation (control). In order for its suc-
cessful operation, each division has to cooperate at each stage of its deployment
and operation. At the deployment phase, the divisions have to provide accurate
information on their business and networked systems. During the operational
phase, each division has to allocate manpower and resources for the proper op-
eration of the system. All these can be accomplished only if the division has
sufficient incentives for real cooperation. Otherwise, the risk management sys-
tem would simply fail as a result of bureaucracy, enterprise politics, and delaying
tactics.
Game theoretic approaches have significant potential in addressing the
above described issues as well as in risk analysis, management, and associated
decision making [3,14,30]. The performance of manual and heuristic schemes de-
grades fast as the scale and complexity of the organization increases. Computer
assistance in observation, decision making, and control of different risk man-
agement aspects is necessary to overcome this problem. Development of such
computer-based support schemes, however, require quantitative representations
and analysis. Game theoretic and analytical frameworks provide a mathematical
abstraction which is useful for generalization of seemingly different problems,
combining the existing ad-hoc schemes under a single umbrella, and opening
doors to novel solutions. At the same time, such frameworks and the associ-
ated scientific methodology leads to streamlining of risk management processes
and possibly more transparency as a consequence of increased observability and
control [2].
Mechanism design [20, 23, 26], which is a field of game theory, has been
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proposed recently as a way to model, analyze, and address risk management
problems [2]. It can be potentially useful especially in developing analytical
frameworks for incentive mechanisms. Game theory in general provides a rich
set of mathematical tools and models for investigating multi-person strategic
decision making where the players (decision makers) compete for limited and
shared resources [7, 13]. Mechanism design studies ways of designing rules and
structure of games such that their outcome achieve certain objectives.
In the context of security risk management, the units of an organization can
be modeled as players (independent decision makers) in a risk management
game since they share and compete for organizational resources. Each player
decides on the allocation of unit’s resources, e.g. in terms of manpower and
investments, to assess and mitigate perceived risks. The task of organization’s
risk manager (designer) is then influence the outcome of this game by imposing
rules and varying its structure such that a satisfactory amount of investment
is made by each unit. Thus, the designer tries to optimize the risk manage-
ment process from the entire organization’s perspective within given resource
constraints, e.g. budget.
This paper adopts a game-theoretic approach and presents a framework
of incentive mechanism design for security risk management. The analytical
framework studied can not only be used to derive guidelines for handling incen-
tives in risk management but also to develop computer-assisted risk management
systems. The main contributions of the paper include:
• A strategic (noncooperative) game approach for analysis of incentives in
(security and IT) risk management.
• An analytical incentive mechanism design framework where the designer
does not have access to utilities of individual players of the underlying
strategic game.
• Study of iterative incentive schemes which can be implemented under in-
formation limitations and their convergence analysis.
• A numerical analysis based on a scenario of a risk management system
deployment.
A more detailed discussion clarifying these contributions and a comparison with
existing literature will be provided in Section 6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the underlying mechanism design and game-theoretic concepts as
well as the model adopted in this work. Section 3 presents incentive mechanism
design for risk management. Section 4 discusses iterative incentive mechanisms
and related distributed algorithms. An example use case scenario and related
numerical analysis is presented in Section 5, which is followed by a brief litera-
ture review in Section 6. The paper concludes with a discussion and concluding
remarks in Section 7.
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2 Game and Mechanism Model
Consider an organization with N autonomous units, which act as independent
decision makers, and a risk manager, which oversees the risk management task of
the entire organization (and is often a special organizational unit itself). This
generic organization may be a large-scale multi-national enterprise (divisions
versus the risk manager at the headquarters), a government (government agen-
cies versus central executives), or even an international organization (individual
countries versus general secretary of the organization).
Adopting a game-theoretic approach, each autonomous unit can be modeled
as a player of a strategic (noncooperative) game with the set of all players
denoted as A. The player i ∈ A independently decides on its respective decision
variable xi, which represents allocation of limited resources such as monetary
investments or manpower, in accordance with own objectives. In majority of
cases, the decisions of players affect each other due to constraints of the en-
vironment. Thus, the players share and compete for resources as part of this
strategic game.
The risk manager D, which is also called designer1 in the context of mech-
anism design, focuses on the aggregate outcome of the strategic game and tries
to ensure that the game satisfies some risk management objectives, e.g. in-
formation collection for assessment or deployment of a new risk management
solution. Unlike the players, the designer achieves its objective only by indirect
means such as providing additional incentives to players in the form of incentive
factors and penalties or imposing rules. It is important to note that the risk
manager cannot directly dictate individual actions of players, which is a realistic
assumption that holds for many types of civilian organizations. The interaction
between risk manager (designer) and organizational units (players) is depicted
in Figure 1.
The N -player strategic game, G is described as follows. Each player i ∈ A
has a respective scalar decision variable2 xi such that
x = [x1, . . . , xN ] ∈ X ⊂ R
N ,
where X is the convex, compact, and nonempty decision space of all players.
The players make their decisions in accordance with their preferences modeled
as customary by real valued utility functions
Ui(x) : X → R.
For analytical tractability, the player utility functions are chosen as continuous,
differentiable, and strictly concave. It is important to note here that players do
not reveal their utilities (preferences) to the designer. Application of a similar
1The terms risk manager and designer as well as (organizational) unit and player will be
used interchangeably for the rest of the paper.
2The analysis can be easily extended to multi-dimensional case. However, since this would
complicate the notation and readability without a significant conceptual contribution, this
paper focuses on scalar decision variables.
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Figure 1: The interaction between the players (autonomous organizational
units) of the underlying strategic game and the risk manager acting as mecha-
nism designer, who observes players actions (investments) x and provides addi-
tional incentives p.
utility function approach to risk management has been discussed in detail in [14,
Chap. 3], where the concave utilities are interpreted as “risk averse”.
While each player gains a utility from its decisions (investments), these re-
sources also have a cost, which can be often expressed in monetary terms. We
assume that that these costs are linear in the allocated resource, βixi, where
βi is the individual per unit cost factor. Each player i aims to minimize its
respective cost function
Ji(x) = βixi − Ui(x) − pixi, (1)
where the linear term pixi represents the incentive factor (or penalty if negative)
provided to the player by the designer D. Thus, player i solves the optimization
problem
min
xi
Ji(xi, x−i),
by choosing an appropriate xi given the decisions of all players denoted by x−i
such that x ∈ X . Formally, strategic game G is defined as:
Definition 1. The strategic (noncooperative) game G is played among the set
of selfish players, A, of cardinality N , on the convex, compact, and non-empty
decision space X ⊂ RN , where
• x = [x1, . . . , xN ] ∈ X denotes the actions of players
• Ui(x) : X → R denotes the utility function of player i ∈ A
• Ji(x) = βixi − Ui(x) − pixi denotes the cost function of player i ∈ A for
given parameters bi and pi ∀i,
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such that each player i solves its own optimization problem
min
xi
Ji(xi, x−i),
by choosing an appropriate xi given the decisions of all players denoted by x−i.
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is a widely-accepted and useful solution con-
cept in strategic games, where no player has an incentive to deviate from it
while others play according to their NE strategies [31, 32]. The NE is at the
same time the intersection point of players’ best responses obtained by solving
their individual optimization problems. The NE of the game G in Definition 1
is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. The Nash equilibrium of the game G in Definition 1, is denoted
by the vector x∗ = [x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ] ∈ X and defined as
x∗i := argmin
xi
Ji(xi, x
∗
−i) ∀i ∈ A,
where x∗−i = [x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
N ].
If some special convexity and compactness conditions are imposed to the
game G, then it admits a unique NE solution, which simplifies mechanism and
algorithm design significantly. We refer to the Appendix A.1 as well as [1,7,33]
for the details and an extensive analysis.
The risk manager (designer) D devises an incentive mechanismM, which
can be represented by the mapping M : X → RN , and implemented through
additional incentives (e.g. subsidies) in player cost functions, pixi, above. Using
incentive mechanismM, the designer aims to achieve a certain risk management
objective, which can be maximization of aggregate player utilities (expected ag-
gregate benefit from risk-related investments) or an independent organizational
target that depends on participation of all players such as deployment of a new
risk management solution. These can be modeled using a designer objective
function V that quantifies the desirability of an outcome x from the designers
perspective. Formally, the function V is defined as
V (x, U(x), p) : X → R.
Thus, the global optimization problem of the designer is
max
p
V (x, Ui(x), p),
which it solves by choosing the vector p = [p1, . . . , pN ], i.e. providing incentive
factors to the players. Note that the designer objective V (possibly) depends on
player utilities U = [U1, . . . , UN ], yet the designer does not have direct knowl-
edge on them. Furthermore, the risk manager may have only a limited budget
B to achieve its goal that leads to the additional constraint
N∑
i=1
pixi ≤ B.
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Mechanism design, as a field of game theory, studies designing the rules
and structure of games such that their outcome achieve certain objectives [11,
20, 23, 26]. Two criteria a mechanism has to satisfy has already been described
above. The player objective of minimizing own cost can also be called as
preference-compatibility. Likewise, the designer objectives of maximizing V or
achieving a global goal can be interpreted as an efficiency criterion. The third
criterion arises from the fact that the interaction between the designer and
players of the game (Figure 1) may motivate the players to misrepresent their
utilities to the designer. They can benefit from misrepresenting their utilities
(exaggerating or diminishing the actual benefits of their investments) to receive
higher incentives. Therefore, mechanism design has a third objective called in-
terchangeably strategy-proofness, truth dominance, or incentive-compatibility in
addition to the objectives of efficiency and preference-compatibility. All these
three criteria are summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Three Criteria of Mechanism Design
Criterion Formulation in the Model
Efficiency Designer objective
Preference- Players minimizing own costs
compatibility (NE as operating point)
Strategy-Proofness No player gains from cheating
2.1 Assumptions
Taking into account the breadth of the field mechanism design, it is useful to
clarify the underlying assumptions of the model studied in this section. The
environment where the players and designer interact is characterized by the
following properties:
• The players and designer operate with limited resources, e.g. under budget
and manpower constraints.
• The organizational structure imposes restrictions on available information
to players and communication between them.
• The designer has no information on the preferences of individual players,
but observes their actions and final costs.
The players share and compete for limited resources in the given environment
under its information and communication constraints. The following assump-
tions are made on the designer and players:
• The designer is honest, i.e. does not try to deceive players.
• Each player acts alone and rationally according to own self interests.
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• The players may try to deceive the designer by hiding or misrepresenting
their own preferences.
• All players follow the rules of the mechanism imposed by the designer.
Implications of these assumptions and limitations of the presented model
will be further discussed in Section 6.
3 Incentive Mechanism Design
This section presents two specific incentive mechanisms for risk management
based on the model of the previous section. In the first mechanism, M1, the
risk manager (designer) aims to maximize the aggregate benefit from security
investments of units, which is the sum of player utilities. This objective is some-
times also called as “social welfare maximization”. The second mechanism,M2
represents a scenario in which the risk manager aims to align efforts of all units
for deployment and operation of an organization-wide risk management solu-
tion. Both mechanisms (their iterative variants) satisfy the criteria in Table 2
under specific conditions. The interaction between the designer and players is
visualized in Figure 2.
Risk Mgr.
Designer Units / Players
Observations
Objective,
Subsidies
Investments
Figure 2: Interaction between risk manager (designer) and organizational units
(players) as part of incentive mechanism design.
3.1 Welfare maximizing mechanism
The optimization problem minxi Ji(x) of player i is a convex one and admits
the unique solution
x∗i =
(
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
)−1
(βi − pi),
under the strict concavity and continuous differentiability assumptions on Ui [8].
Any such solution x∗ that solves all player optimization problems is by definition
preference-compatible.
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It is important to note that, if there was no incentive term, pixi, in player
cost, each unit would act according to self interest only resulting in a subopti-
mal result for the entire organization; a situation sometime termed as tragedy
of commons. The designer can prevent this by providing a carefully selected
incentive scheme [4, 5].
The risk manager D objective in mechanism M1 is to maximize sum of
player utilities,
∑
i Ui(xi). Considering that under the assumptions of Section 2
the risk manager does not know these utilities makes this goal paradoxical at
first glance. However, the risk manager can actually achieve it in a carefully
designed mechanism where it deduces the needed parameters for the solution
from the observed actions of players.
Formally, the designer solves the constrained optimization problem
max
x
V (x)⇔ max
x
∑
i
Ui(x) such that
∑
i
pixi ≤ B. (2)
The optimal solution to this constrained problem by definition satisfies the ef-
ficiency criterion. The associated Lagrangian function is then
L(x) =
∑
i
Ui(x) + λ
(
B −
∑
i
pixi
)
,
where λ ≥ 0 is a scalar Lagrange multiplier [8]. Under the concavity assumptions
on Ui, this leads to
∂L
∂xi
= 0⇒
1
pi
N∑
j=1
∂Uj(x)
∂xi
= λ, ∀i ∈ A, (3)
and the associated budget constraint3 is
∂L
∂λ
= 0⇒
∑
i
pixi = B. (4)
Meeting both the preference-compatibility and efficiency criteria requires
alignment of player and designer optimization problems. This alignment can be
achieved by choosing the Lagrange multiplier λ and player incentive factors p
in such a way that
βi − pi
pi
+
1
pi
∑
j 6=i
∂Uj(x)
∂xi
= λ, ∀i ∈ A, (5)
and ∑
i
pi
(
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
)−1
(βi − pi) = B. (6)
3An underlying assumption here is that the risk manager (designer) utilizes all of its budget,
i.e. the constraint is active.
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Any solution to the set of N + 1 nonlinear equations (5)-(6) is by definition
a Nash equilibrium as it lies at the intersection of the player best responses.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Any solution of the mechanism M1 described above obtained
from (5)-(6) is both player preference-compatible (based on the strategic game
G, given in Definition 1) and efficient, i.e. maximizes
∑
i Ui(x).
If the designer D wants to compute the incentive factors p directly by solving
(5)-(6), it needs to ask each individual player i for its utility, more specifically
∂Ui(x)/∂xj ∀j ∈ A. However, the players have now a motivation to misrepresent
their utilities to the designer in order to gain a larger share of resources or
incentive factors. To see this, consider a cheating player i reporting U˜i to the
designer instead of their true values. If the designer believes the player and
solves (5)-(6) using these, then the resulting incentive factor p˜ will naturally be
different from what it should have been, p. A selfish or malicious player can thus
manipulate such a scheme, which by definition is not strategy-proof. Note that,
the risk manager has access to costs βixi and actions xi of individual players,
which can be, for example, part of an organizational reporting process.
One way to address the issue of strategy-proofness is to devise additional
schemes to detect potential player misbehavior (for which players already have
a motivation). This, however, brings an additional layer of overhead to the
overall system both in terms of communication and computing requirements.
Alternatively, one can design an iterative mechanism that is based on
observation of player actions x instead of asking for their word (utilities). This
approach is the basis of the iterative schemes that will be presented in Section 4.
3.2 Mechanism with global objective
The second mechanism, M2 differs from the social welfare maximizing one
M1 discussed in the previous subsection. In this case, the designer has an
organization-wide or “global” objective represented by the strictly concave and
nondecreasing function F (x) which does not directly depend on player utilities.
This organization-wide objective could be, for example, deployment and oper-
ation of an organization-wide risk management solution that naturally requires
cooperation from all units and an alignment of efforts.
In mechanism M2, the risk manager formally solves the constrained opti-
mization problem
max
x
F (x) such that
∑
i
pixi ≤ B. (7)
The associated Lagrangian function is then
L(x) = F (x) + λ
(
B −
∑
i
pixi
)
,
where λ > 0 is a scalar Lagrange multiplier. Note that the constraint is al-
ways active in this case due to the definition of F (x). Under the concavity
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assumptions on F (x), this leads to
∂L
∂xi
= 0⇒
1
pi
∂F (x)
∂xi
= λ, ∀i ∈ A, (8)
and the associated budget constraint is
∂L
∂λ
= 0⇒
∑
i
pixi = B. (9)
Combining this with the player optimization problems to ensure efficiency
and preference-compatibility as in the previous subsection leads to
1
pi
∂F (x)
∂xi
= λ, ∀i ∈ A, (10)
and ∑
i
pi
(
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
)−1
(βi − pi) = B, (11)
which are direct counterparts of (5)-(6). As before, any solution constitutes a
Nash equilibrium as it lies at the intersection of the player best responses.
Proposition 2. Any solution of the mechanism M2 described above obtained
from (10)-(11) is both player preference-compatible (based on the strategic game
G, given in Definition 1) and efficient, i.e. maximizes F (x).
In mechanism M2, the risk manager has to evaluate the term ∂F (x)/∂xi
for each unit i, in addition to asking them for their utilities and cost factors.
This term can be interpreted as the rate of contribution of each unit to the
organization-wide objective. Since the risk manager sets this objective, it can
be computed or estimated with reasonable accuracy. However, as before the
solution of (10)-(11) also depends on individual unit utilities and cost factors.
Therefore, mechanism M2 –similar to M1 – requires deployment of iterative
methods in order to meet the criterion of strategy-proofness.
3.3 Interdependent Utilities and Linear Influence Model
In the presented model and analysis, utilities of individual players (units) may
depend not only on their own actions but also on those of others, e.g. Ui(x) =
Ui([x1, . . . , xN ]). In other words, a unit benefits not only from own risk invest-
ments but also from efforts of other related units. Such utility functions are
called interdependent or nonseparable in contrast to separable player utilities,
Ui(xi), that depend only own actions. If the player utilities are separable, then
the player decisions are almost completely decoupled from each other except
from external resource constraints (such as the incentives they receive from the
designer). This simplifies development of decentralized schemes significantly.
One possible way of modeling interdependencies in player utilities is the lin-
ear influence model, which captures how actions (investments) of players (units)
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affect others. As a first-order approximation these effects are modeled as linear
resulting in an influence matrix defined as
W :=
{
1 , if i = j,
wij , otherwise.
(12)
where 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 denotes the non-negative effect of unit j (’s investment) on
unit i. Notice that this effect may well be zero.
Define now the vector of effective investments xe = [xe1, . . . , x
e
N ], where the
effective investment of unit i is
xei :=
∑
j
Wijxj = (Wx)i,
and (·)i denotes the i
th element of a vector.
Naturally, it is possible to develop more complex nonlinear models to cap-
ture interdependencies between units and their actions. However, given the
limitations on information collection and accuracy, the linear first order ap-
proximation described provides a good starting point. Therefore, we will use
linear influence model in the case of interdependent (non-separable) utilities for
the rest of the paper.
Note that under the linear influence model, the nonseparable utility, Ui(x),
of player i is given by
Ui(x
e
i ) = Ui ((Wx)i) .
4 Iterative Incentive Mechanisms
Mechanisms M1 and M2 as defined in the previous section are shown to be
efficient and preference-compatible (See Propositions 1 and 2) but not strategy-
proof. This section presents two iterative variants of these mechanisms that
satisfy all three criterion and can be implemented under information limitations.
4.1 Iterative mechanism with global objective
In the iterative mechanism with global objective, IM2, both the risk manager
and units adopt an iterative scheme to facilitate information exchange that does
not allow cheating, hence resulting in a strategy-proof mechanism. Specifically,
the risk manager updates the Lagrangian multiplier λ in (8) gradually according
to
λ(n+ 1) = λ(n) + κd
[∑
i
pi(n)xi(n)−B
]+
, (13)
and computes the individual player incentive factors
pi(n) =
1
λ(n)
∂F (x(n))
∂xi
. (14)
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Here, n = 1, . . . denotes the iteration number or time-step. The units (players)
in return react to given incentive factors by updating their investment decisions
in order to minimize their own costs such that
xi(n+ 1) = φxi(n)
+ (1− φ)
(
∂Ui(x(n))
∂xi
)−1
(βi − pi(n)) ∀i,
(15)
where 0 < φ < 1 is a relaxation constant used by the players to prevent excessive
fluctuations. Alternatively, this behavior can be justified with caution or inertia
of the organizational units.
The equilibrium solution(s) of (13)-(15) clearly coincides with that of (10)-
(11). Hence, the iterative mechanism IM2, assuming that it converges, solves
the same problem as mechanism M2. Furthermore, it is strategy-proof since
at each update step, the players make decisions according to their own self
interests and do not have the opportunity of manipulating the system. To see
this, assume otherwise and let player i “misrepresent” its actions x˜i = xi + δ
for some δ ∈ R. Then, the player’s instantaneous cost is Ji(x˜i) > Ji(xi) at each
step of the iteration. Hence, the players have no incentive to “cheat”. These
results are summarized in the following theorem which extends Proposition 2:
Theorem 4.1. Any solution of the iterative mechanism with global objective,
IM2 described above and in Algorithm 1 is player preference-compatible, effi-
cient, and strategy-proof.
Information flow and limitations play a crucial role in implementation of the
iterative mechanism IM2. In practice, the risk manager is assumed to observe
the actions of units which they have to reveal in order to receive incentives.
Based on this information and the total budget, the risk manager can easily
implement (13). Then, it only needs to estimate the individual marginal con-
tributions of units to the overall objective, ∂F (x(n))/∂xi at a given moment in
order to decide on actual incentive factors in (14).
Likewise, given own cost estimates βi and incentive factor pi, each unit
(player) only has to determine the marginal benefit from its own actions, ∂Ui(x(n))/∂xi
in order to implement (15). If the unit has a separable utility, then this is sim-
ply equivalent to ∂Ui(xi(n))/∂xi. In the interdependent utility case, under the
linear influence model this quantity turns out to be the marginal benefit from
the effective action,
∂Ui(x(n))
∂xi
=
∂Ui(x
e
i (n))
∂xei
∑
j Wijxj
xi
=
∂Ui(x
e
i (n))
∂xei
,
as a result of Wii = 1 and the definitions of respective quantities. Algorithm 1
summarizes the steps of the iterative mechanism with global objective, IM2.
Convergence Analysis of IM2
A basic stability analysis is provided for a continuous-time approximation of the
iterative mechanism with global objective, IM2. For tractability, let the player
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Algorithm 1: Iterative mechanism IM2
Input: Designer : budget B and global objective F (x)
Input: Players : cost factor βi and utilities Ui, ∀i
Result: Player investments x and incentive factors p
1 Initial investments x0 and incentive factors p0 ;
2 repeat
3 begin Designer:
4 Observe player investments x ;
5 Update λ according to (13) ;
6 Estimate marginal contributions of players to global objective,
∂F (x)/∂xi ;
7 foreach player i do
8 Compute incentive factor pi from (14) ;
9 end
10 end
11 begin Players:
12 foreach player i do
13 Estimate marginal utility ∂Ui(x)/∂xi ;
14 Compute investment xi from (15) ;
15 end
16 end
17 until end of iteration (negotiation);
utilities be of the form Ui = αi log(xi). Further define the global objective
function of the risk manager as F (x) :=
∑
i γixi, for some γi > 0 ∀i.
Substituting pi with γi/λ, the continuous-time counterpart of (13)-(15) is
λ˙ =
dλ
dt
= κλ
1
λ
(∑
i
γixi(n)−B
)
(16)
x˙i = −κi
∂Ji
∂xi
= κi
(
αi
xi
+
γi
λ
− βi
)
, ∀i ∈ A.
where t denotes time and κλ, κi > 0 are step-size constants. As in the discrete-
time version, the players adopt here a gradient best response algorithm. Define
the Lyapunov function
VL :=
1
2
(∑
i γixi −B
λ
)2
+
1
2
∑
i
(
αi
xi
+
γi
λ
− βi
)2
,
which is nonnegative except at the solution(s) of (13)-(15), i.e. VL(x
∗, λ∗) = 0.
Taking the derivative of VL with respect to time yields
V˙L(x, λ) = −2
∑
i γixi
λ3
(∑
i γixi −B
λ
)2
−
∑
i
αi
x2i
(
αi
xi
+
γi
λ
− βi
)2
.
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Consider the region where F (x) =
∑
i γixi > 0. Then, there exists an ǫ > 0
such that
V˙L(x, λ) ≤ ǫVL < 0, ∀(x, λ) 6= (x
∗, λ∗),
i.e. for any point of the trajectory (x, λ) not equal to a solution of (13) and
(15). Thus, the continuous-time algorithm is exponentially stable [22] on the
set X¯ := {x ∈ X : F (x) > 0}. This result, which is summarized in the next
theorem, is a strong indicator of fast convergence [9] of the discrete-time iterative
pricing mechanism (14)-(17).
Proposition 3. The continuous-time approximation of the iterative mechanism
IM2, given by (16) exponentially converges to a solution of (13)-(15) on the
set X¯ = {x ∈ X : F (x) > 0}.
The exponential convergence result above indicates a very fast convergence
rate. To see this, let x(0) be the initial player investments and x∗ denote a
solution of (13)-(15). Then, for the player investments x(t) under continuous-
time approximation of the iterative mechanism IM2 the following holds:
‖x(t)− x∗‖ ≤ α ‖x(0)− x∗‖ e−βt,
for t ≥ 0 and some α, β > 0. In other words, the investment levels approach
their equilibrium values exponentially fast.
4.2 Iterative welfare maximizing mechanism
The iterative welfare maximizing mechanism IM1 extends mechanism M1.
Same as the previous mechanism, the risk manager updates the Lagrangian
multiplier λ according to (13) and the unit updates are given by (15).
However, the computation of individual player incentive factors is more in-
volved due to the dependence of the objective (welfare maximization) on indi-
vidual player utilities
pi(n) =
1
λ(n)
∑
j
∂Uj(x(n))
∂xi
, (17)
which follows from (5). At first glance, it seems that the designer has to ask
players again for their marginal utility which defeats the purpose of the iterative
approach, namely ensuring strategy-proofness. Fortunately, the designer can
circumvent this issue by utilizing side information, in this case player cost factors
β, within the linear influence model.
It directly follows from the linear influence model that
∂Uj
∂xi
=
∂Uj
∂xej
∂xej
∂xi
=
∂Uj
∂xej
Wji =
∂Uj
∂xj
Wji.
The actions of any player i chosen according to a (relaxed) best response (15),
and observed by the designer yields the information
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
= βi − pi
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to the designer. Hence, the substitution
∑
j
∂Uj(x(n))
∂xi
=
∑
j
(βi − pi)Wji, ∀i, j ,
can be used in (17) to obtain
λp = WT (β − p).
Thus, the designer implements
p = (WT + λI)−1WTβ (18)
together with (13) to determine player incentive factors. Here, (·)T denotes the
transpose operator and I the identity matrix. These results are summarized in
the following theorem which extends Proposition 1:
Theorem 4.2. Any solution of the iterative mechanism with global objective,
IM1 described above and in Algorithm 2 is player preference-compatible, effi-
cient, and strategy-proof.
The information structure in mechanism IM1 is similar to that of IM2 with
the following differences. In IM1, the risk manager has to estimate the linear
dependencies in the system represented by the matrixW and observe cost factors
β of units in addition to their investments. These information requirements
are due to the complex nature of the welfare maximization objective, which
necessitates additional (indirect) communication between the risk manager and
units in practice. Algorithm 2 summarizes the steps of the welfare maximizing
mechanism IM1.
Convergence Analysis of IM1
A basic stability analysis is provided for a continuous-time approximation of
the iterative mechanism IM1 similar to the one of the IM2 in the previous
subsection. For tractability, let the player utilities be of the form Ui = αi log(xi)
as before.
Substituting pi with
pi =
βi
1 + λ
,
which follows from (18) and W = I, the continuous-time counterpart of (13)
and (15) is
λ˙ =
dλ
dt
= κλ
1
1 + λ
(∑
i
βixi(n)−B
)
(19)
x˙i = −κi
∂Ji
∂xi
= κi
(
αi
xi
+
βi
1 + λ
− βi
)
, ∀i ∈ A.
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where t denotes time and κλ, κi > 0 are step-size constants. As in the discrete-
time version, the players adopt here a gradient best response algorithm. Define
the Lyapunov function
V¯L :=
1
2
(∑
i βixi −B
1 + λ
)2
+
1
2
∑
i
(
αi
xi
+
βi
1 + λ
− βi
)2
,
which is nonnegative except at the solution(s) of (13) and (15), i.e. V¯L(x
∗, λ∗) =
0.
Taking the derivative of V¯L with respect to time yields
˙¯VL(x, λ) = −2
∑
i βixi
(1 + λ)3
(∑
i βixi −B
1 + λ
)2
−
∑
i
αi
x2i
(
αi
xi
+
βi
1 + λ
− βi
)2
.
Consider the region where
∑
i βixi > 0. Then, there exists an ǫ > 0 such that
˙¯VL(x, λ) ≤ ǫV¯L < 0, ∀(x, λ) 6= (x
∗, λ∗),
i.e. for any point of the trajectory (x, λ) not equal to a solution of (13) and
(15). Thus, the continuous-time algorithm is exponentially stable [22] on the
set X˜ := {x ∈ X :
∑
i βixi > 0}. This result, which is summarized in the
next theorem, is a strong indicator of fast convergence [9] of the discrete-time
iterative pricing mechanism IM1.
Proposition 4. The continuous-time approximation of the iterative mechanism
IM1, given by (19) exponentially converges to a solution on the set X˜ := {x ∈
X :
∑
i βixi > 0}.
5 Use Case Scenario and Numerical Analysis
In order to illustrate the incentive mechanism framework for risk management,
a use case scenario is described next. Since most organizations do not openly
publish their actual risk management structure or numbers, this scenario is
naturally hypothetical and the numbers in the subsequent numerical analysis
do not necessarily coincide with real world counterparts.
5.1 Example Use Case Scenario
In this subsection, a possible use cases scenario is described for a large-scale
enterprise with multiple autonomous business units, denoted by set A, who col-
laborate and share IT infrastructure in order to provide various services and
products. In addition to the business units, the enterprise headquarters has a
special security risk management division, which will be simply referred to as
“risk manager” here. The task of the risk manager, D, is successful deploy-
ment and operation of security and IT risk management projects that entail
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enterprise-wide computer-assisted information collection (observation), risk as-
sessment (decision making), and mitigation (control).
The results and algorithms described in this paper can be utilized to de-
velop a manual risk management strategy as well as a technical system to han-
dle a large number of business units and multiple concurrent risk management
projects. For simplicity and as a special case of the latter, this scenario focuses
on the former.
Let the risk manager start a project to improve robustness of the IT systems
involved in a product against security threats. The success of the project natu-
rally depends on collaboration of the 6 specific business units involved at various
stages of the product in question. However, not each unit plays an equal role in
creation of the product, and hence, their risk exposure is different. Therefore,
those units with a more significant role have to make a larger investment to the
project and their IT systems.
During the project, the divisions have to provide accurate information on
their business and networked systems. At the operational phase, each division
allocates manpower and resources for the proper operation of the system. Hence,
participation in this risk management project is associated with a certain cost
to each unit in terms of investments and manpower. Although each unit sees
a certain amount of value in the new risk management system, if they are left
alone to themselves, their contributions may not be sufficient for the successful
realization of the risk management system. Thus, the risk manager uses parts of
its budget for subsidizing individual unit investments, if necessary in the form
of manpower and expertise.
Let x = [x1, x2, . . . , x6] denote the investments (project contributions) of
business units. Their contribution to the project is evaluated using the multi-
variable objective function F (x), which describes the goal of the entire project.
The individual marginal contribution of a business unit i (one of six) to the
project goal at a given (project) state is given by the derivative, ∂F (x)/∂xi. It
is important to note that risk manager may not know the exact form of F (x)
before hand, and has to estimate ∂F (x)/∂xi for each business unit i at a given
state.
The goal of the risk manager is to ensure the success of the project, which
may be captured by making the objective function achieve a certain minimum
threshold value, i.e. F (x) > Vthreshold. The subsidies given to the units (mone-
tarily or in the form of assistance) are determined in proportion to their current
investments. For example, the business unit i receives pixi. These subsidies
have to be of course within the allocated budget, i.e.
∑6
i=1 pixi ≤ B. Note
that, the budget in question is periodic, e.g. B units per month or year.
The interaction between the risk manager and individual units is designed
according to Algorithm 1 based on the IM2. The actual time-scale of the
iteration depends on the specific requirements of the enterprise. For example,
the risk managers and representatives from the units may come together in
weekly or bi-weekly intervals to evaluate the progress, which gives some time to
the units and manager for updating own evaluations on marginal benefits and
contributions, respectively. We next present a numerical example to further
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illustrate the scenario described.
5.2 Numerical Analysis
Based on the use case scenario, an example is numerically analyzed with a risk
manager and 6 units, who implement the iterative mechanism IM2 using Algo-
rithm 1. The budget is B = 3, the global objective function of the risk manager
is F (x) =
∑6
i=1 γixi, where γ = [0.8, 0.4, 0.5, 0.2, 0.3, 0.1], the utilities of
units are in the form of Ui(xi) = αi log(xi), where α = [0.9, 0.7, 0.6, 0.8, 0.2, 0.4],
and the unit cost factor is β = 3 for all six units. Each unit starts the itera-
tion with an initial investment of xi = 0.5 ∀i and receives an initial incentive
factor of pi = 0.3 ∀i. The measurement units of the budget B and invest-
ments x are assumed to be on the order of millions of dollars. The step-size
constants are chosen as κd = 0.05 and φ = 0.3. The success of the project is
decided by whether the objective function passes minimum threshold of 2.5, i.e.
F (x∗) > 2.5.
The evolution of unit investment levels x(n) is shown in Figure 3 and the as-
sociated incentive factors p(n) in Figure 4. The first unit, which contributes the
most to the objective receives a higher amount of aid from the risk manager than
others. The algorithm converges fast, in 10−15 steps, for the given parameters,
as indicated by the exponential convergence of its continuous-time counterpart.
For a time interval of 1−2 weeks per iteration, this corresponds to 3−6 months
in practice. Although this convergence time may seem as a disadvantage at
the first glance, in a practical project with highly varying parameters, such an
online algorithm may even be beneficial in terms of adaptability over time.
In contrast, the investment results of units without any incentive mechanism
in place, y(n), is shown in Figure 5. A comparison of the objective function F (x)
with and without an incentive mechanism is depicted in Figure 6. Naturally,
this improvement comes at an expense of the budget B spent entirely by the
risk manager.
6 Literature Review
Building upon its successful applications to economics and engineering (e.g. net-
works), game theory has been recently utilized to model and analyze security
problems [2]. Similar formalization efforts have been ongoing in the risk man-
agement area with the goal of developing analytical approaches to (security)
risk analysis, management, and associated decision making [3, 14, 17, 30]. Un-
surprisingly, game theory enjoys an increased interest in the risk management
community [6, 16, 21, 24], as it provides a valuable and relevant mathematical
framework [2, 7, 13]. Recently, a game theoretic approach has been developed
for security and risk-related decision making and investments in [27, 28].
Mechanism design [20, 23, 26] is a field of game theory, where a designer
imposes rules on the underlying strategic (noncooperative) game in order to
achieve certain desirable objectives such as social welfare maximization or a
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Algorithm 2: Iterative mechanism IM1
Input: Designer : budget B and objective
∑
i Ui
Input: Players : cost factor βi and utilities Ui, ∀i
Result: Player investments x and incentive factors p
1 Initial investments x0 and incentive factors p0 ;
2 repeat
3 begin Designer:
4 Observe player actions x and cost factors β ;
5 Estimate the linear influence matrix W ;
6 Update λ according to (13) ;
7 Compute incentive factors p from (18) ;
8 end
9 begin Players:
10 foreach player i do
11 Estimate marginal utility ∂Ui(x)/∂xi ;
12 Compute investment xi from (15) ;
13 end
14 end
15 until end of iteration (negotiation);
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x
Figure 3: The evolution of unit investment levels x(n) under Algorithm 1.
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Figure 4: The evolution of incentive factors p(n) under Algorithm 1.
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Figure 5: The evolution of unit investment levels y(n) without any incentive
mechanism implemented.
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Figure 6: A comparison of the objective function F (x(n)) with and without
an incentive mechanism. Under the incentive mechanism it passes the success
threshold of 2.5.
system-wide goal. Hence, mechanism design can be viewed as a reverse engi-
neering of games. It is especially useful in developing analytical frameworks for
incentive mechanisms. Recently, there has been widespread interest in using
mechanism design for modeling, analyzing and solving problems in network re-
source allocation problems that are decentralized in nature [18,20,23,25,37,38].
It has also been applied to resource allocation in the context of engineering op-
timization [15]. A basic game design approach to security investments in the
risk management context has been discussed in [2].
The presented incentive mechanism framework makes use of both mechanism
design [11,20,23,26] and game theory [7,13], which provide solid analytical and
conceptual foundations. In contrast to many existing studies [10, 12, 19] focus-
ing on answering the question of “which mechanisms are possible to design”,
this work adopts a constructive approach to develop a practical methodology
and applies it to security risk management. Despite sharing the game-theoretic
approach of earlier work [27, 28], it distinguishes from these through the mech-
anism design framework developed on top of the game. A similar perspective
has been briefly discussed in [2, Chap. 6], which however has not taken into
account incentive-compatibility aspects.
The article [15], which shares a similar goal as this one, discusses the prob-
lem of designing an allocation scheme that leads to truthful reporting by the
engineers and allocation of the scarce resources within the VCG framework.
This work distinguishes from [15] in multiple ways in addition to its focus on
22
risk management. First, the mechanisms discussed here are iterative, enable op-
eration even under limited information, and do not require any direct revelation
of preferences by the users or risk manager. Similar iterative schemes have been
analyzed in depth in the networking literature, e.g. see [1, 36, 38]. Second, the
sufficient conditions for convergence and operation of the iterative mechanisms
here are not as restrictive as in [15]. Finally, the properties of iterative inter-
action algorithms are analyzed rigorously from a dynamical system perspective
and their rapid convergence is proven.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The analytical incentive mechanism design framework presented can not only
be used to derive guidelines for handling incentives in risk management but
also to develop computer-assisted schemes. The abstract nature of the frame-
work is an advantage in terms of widespread applicability to diverse situations
and organization types. In order to satisfy all three objectives of efficiency,
preference-compatibility and strategy-proofness, iterative incentive mechanisms
and related algorithms are developed which also allow implementation under
information limitations. These mechanisms are very straightforward to analyze
and implement numerically, which is especially useful since any practical imple-
mentation of such incentive mechanism will most probably involve some kind of
computer-assistance. The risk manager has then the option to evaluate various
scenarios through simulations before actual deployment. This is illustrated with
a hypothetical deployment scenario and a numerical example.
The presented inventive mechanism framework can be extended in multiple
directions. One immediate extension is multiple decision variables. For example,
units may need to distinguish between monetary investments and local resources
such as manpower. Similarly, the risk manager may utilize multiple separate
incentive factors. A related but more challenging extension is multi-criteria
decision making, where preferences are not simply expressed through scalar
valued functions such as U and F . This is an open research area also in decision
and optimization theories.
The limitations of the utility-based approach adopted here is also worth not-
ing. The expression of preferences through specific (continuous, differentiable)
functions is obviously a simplification to facilitate devising analytically tractable
models. However, as it can be seen in Sections 4 and 5, the resulting algorithms
do not necessarily require the players estimate their whole utility beforehand.
A step-by-step iterative estimation process is fully sufficient to establish and
communicate these preferences.
An underlying assumption of the model until now has been the fixed nature of
player preferences or utility functions. Under this assumption, the risk manager
can influence unit decisions only by introducing additive incentive factors to
their cost structure as discussed. In reality however, the unit preferences are
open to changes through psychological factors. The arts of persuasion and
politics may “shift” the utility curves in the model. Quantification of such
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factors is obviously a significant yet open research challenge.
An approach closely related to the strategic (noncooperative) game frame-
work discussed in this paper, is based on coalitional (cooperative) games [13,35].
How to motivate team building and cooperation in security and risk management
has been recently discussed in [34] as well as in [2, Chap. 6]. This alternative
approach provides a complementary and potentially very interesting research
direction.
Some of the other open research directions follow directly from relaxing the
assumptions in Section 2. Improving the robustness of the incentive mechanisms
against malicious units who do not follow the rules or have utilities orthogonal
to other users (sometimes referred to as adversarial mechanism design) is an
emerging and relevant research area. Detection of such misbehavior is also of
both practical and theoretical interest. In parallel to users, the relaxation of the
assumption on risk manager’s honesty leads to similarly interesting questions
such as how can a unit detect and respond to misbehavior (e.g. unfairness) of
the risk manager.
Appendix
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
This appendix revisits the analysis in [1,33] on existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium.
In the strategic game G given in Definition 1, the strategy (decision) space
of the players is assumed to be convex, compact, and has a nonempty interior.
Furthermore, the cost functions of the players, Ji, i ∈ A, is strictly convex in
xi and at least twice continuously differentiable due to its definition as well as
those of utility functions Ui, i ∈ A. Therefore, the game G admits (at least) a
Nash equilibrium from Theorem 4.4 in [7, p.176].
Next, additional conditions are imposed such that the game G admits a
unique NE solution. Toward this end, define the pseudo-gradient operator
∇J := [∂J1(x)/∂x1 · · · ∂JN (x)/∂xN ]
T
:= g(x). (20)
Subsequently, let the N ×N matrix G(x) be the Jacobian of g(x) with respect
to x:
G(x) :=


b1 a12 · · · a1N
...
. . .
...
aN1 aN2 · · · bN

 , (21)
where bi and aij are defined as bi :=
∂2Ji(x)
∂x2
i
and ai,j :=
∂2Ji(x)
∂xi∂xj
, respectively.
Assumption 1. The symmetric matrix G(x) + G(x)T , where G(x) is defined
in (21), is positive definite, i.e. G(x) +G(x)T > 0 for all x ∈ X .
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Assumption 2. The strategy space X of the game G can be described as
X := {x ∈ RN : hj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . r}, (22)
where hj : R
N → R, j = 1, 2, . . . r, hj(x) is convex in its arguments for all j, and
the set X is bounded and has a nonempty interior. In addition, the derivative of
at least one of the constraints with respect to xi, {dhj(x)/dxi, j = 1, 2, . . . r},
is nonzero for i = 1, 2, . . . N , ∀x ∈ X .
Now, revisiting the analysis in [1, 33], it is shown that the game G admits a
unique Nash equilibrium under Assumptions 1 and 2.
In view of Assumption 2, the Lagrangian function for player i in this game
is given by
Li(x, µ) = Ji(x) +
r∑
j=1
µi,jhj(x), (23)
where µi,j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . r are the Lagrange multipliers of player i [8, p.
278]. We now provide a proposition for the game G with conditions similar to
the well known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions (Proposition 3.3.1, p.
310, [8]).
Proposition 5. Let x∗ be a NE point of the game G and Assumptions 1-2 hold.
There exists then a unique set of Lagrange multipliers, {φi,j : j = 1, 2, . . . r, i =
1, 2, . . . N}, such that
dL(x∗, φ)
dxi
=
dJi(x
∗)
dxi
+
r∑
j=1
φ∗i,j
dhj(x
∗)
dxi
= 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . N,
φi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j, and φi,j = 0, ∀j /∈ Ai(x
∗), ∀i ,
where Ai(x
∗) is the set of active constraints in ith player’s minimization problem
at NE point x∗.
Proof. The proof essentially follows lines similar to the ones of the Proposition
3.3.1 of [8], where the penalty approach is used to approximate the original
constrained problem by an unconstrained problem that involves a violation of
the constraints. The main difference here is the repetition of this process for
each individual xi at the NE point x
∗.
Define now a more compact notation the vector of Lagrangian functions as
L := [L1, . . . , LN ], and the N × N diagonal matrix of Lagrange multipliers for
the jth constraint as Φj = diag[φ1,j, φ2,j, . . . φN,j].
By Proposition 5 and Assumption 2, a NE point x(1) satisfies
∇L(x(1),Φ(1)) = g(x(1)) +
r∑
j=1
Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1)) = 0, (24)
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where Φ
(1)
j ≥ 0 is unique for each j. Assume there are two different NE points
x(0) and x(1). Then, one can also write the counterpart of (24) for x(0). Following
an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 2 in [33], one can show
that this leads to a contradiction. We present a brief outline of a simplified
version of that proof for the sake of completeness.
Multiplying (24) and its counterpart for x(0) from left by (x(0)−x(1))T , and
then adding them together, we obtain
0 = (x(0) − x(1))T∇L(x(1),Φ(1))
+
(
∇L(x(1),Φ(1))
)T
(x(0) − x(1))
+(x(1) − x(0))T∇L(x(0),Φ(0))
= (x(0) − x(1))T
(
g(x(1))− g(x(0))
)
+
(
g(x(1))− g(x(0))
)T
(x(0) − x(1))
+(x(1) − x(0))T
∑r
j=1[Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1))
−Φ
(0)
j ∇hj(x
(0))].
(25)
Define the strategy vector x(θ) as a convex combination of the two equilib-
rium points x(0) , x(1) :
x(θ) = θx(1) + (1 − θ)x(0),
where 0 < θ < 1. Take the derivative of g(x(θ)) with respect to θ,
dg(x(θ))
dθ
= G(x(θ))
dx(θ)
dθ
= G(x(θ))(x(1) − x(0)), (26)
where G(x) is defined in (21). Integrating (26) over θ yields
g(x(1))− g(x(0)) =
[∫ 1
0
G(x(θ))dθ
]
(x(1) − x(0)). (27)
Multiplying (27) from left by (x(1)− x(0))T , the transpose of (27) from right by
(x(1) − x(0)), and adding these two terms yields
(x(1) − x(0))T
[∫ 1
0
G(x(θ)) +GT (x(θ))dθ
]
(x(1) − x(0)). (28)
Since G(x(θ)) +GT (x(θ)) is positive definite by Assumption 1 and the sum of
two positive definite matrices is positive definite, the matrix G¯ :=
∫ 1
0 G(x(θ)) +
GT (x(θ))dθ is positive definite.
Similarly, we have
d∇h(x(θ))
dθ
= H(x(θ))
dx(θ)
dθ
= H(x(θ))(x1 − x0), (29)
where H(x) is the Jacobian of ∇h(x) and positive definite due to convexity of
h(x) by definition. The third term in (25)
(x(0) − x(1))T
∑r
j=1[Φ
(0)
j ∇hj(x
(0))− Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1))],
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is less than
r∑
j=1
[Φ
(1)
j − Φ
(0)
j ][hj(x
(1))− hj(x
(0))],
due to convexity of h(x). Since for each constraint j, hj(x) ≤ 0 ∀x, Φ
(i)
j hj(x
(i)) =
0, i = 0, 1, and Φj is positive definite, where the latter two follow from Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, this term is also non-positive.
The sum of the first two terms in (25) are the negative of (28), which is
strictly positive for all x(1) 6= x(0). Hence, (25) is strictly negative which leads
to a contradiction unless x(1) = x(0). Thus, there exists a unique NE point in
the game G.
References
[1] Alpcan, T.: Noncooperative games for control of networked systems. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL (2006)
[2] Alpcan, T., Bas¸ar, T.: Network Security: A Decision and Game Theoretic
Approach. Cambridge University Press (2011). URL http://www.tansu.
alpcan.org/book.php
[3] Alpcan, T., Bambos, N.: Modeling dependencies in security risk manage-
ment. In: Proc. of 4th Intl. Conf. on Risks and Security of Internet and
Systems (Crisis). Toulouse, France (2009)
[4] Alpcan, T., Pavel, L.: Nash equilibrium design and optimization. In: Proc.
of Intl. Conf. on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2009). Istanbul,
Turkey (2009)
[5] Alpcan, T., Pavel, L., Stefanovic, N.: A control theoretic approach to
noncooperative game design. In: Proc. of 48th IEEE Conf. on Decision
and Control. Shanghai, China (2009)
[6] and, E.P.C.: Risks and games: Intelligent actors and fallible systems. In:
Proc. of 2nd Intl. Symp. on Engineering Systems. Cambridge, MA, USA
(2009)
[7] Bas¸ar, T., Olsder, G.J.: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd edn.
Philadelphia, PA: SIAM (1999)
[8] Bertsekas, D.: Nonlinear Programming, 2nd edn. Athena Scientific, Bel-
mont, MA (1999)
[9] Bertsekas, D., Tsitsiklis, J.N.: Parallel and Distributed Compuation: Nu-
merical Methods. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ (1989)
27
[10] Boche, H., Naik, S.: Mechanism design and implementation theoretic per-
spective of interference coupled wireless systems. In: Proc. of 47th Annual
Allerton Conf. on Communication, Control, and Computing. Monticello,
IL, USA (2009)
[11] Boche, H., Naik, S., Alpcan, T.: Characterization on non-manipulable and
pareto optimal resource allocation strategies in interference coupled wireless
systems. In: Proc. of 29th IEEE Conf. on Computer Communications
(Infocom). San Diego, CA, USA (2010)
[12] Dasgupta, P., Hammmond, P., Maskin, E.: The implementation of social
choice rules: Some general results of incentive compatibility. Review of
Economic Studies 46, 185–216 (1979)
[13] Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press (1991)
[14] Garvey, P.R.: Analytical Methods for Risk Management: A Systems Engi-
neering Perspective. Statistics: textbook and monographs. Chapman and
Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, FL, USA (2009)
[15] Guikema, S.D.: Incentive compatible resource allocation in concurrent de-
sign. Engineering Optimization 38(2), 209–226 (2006). DOI 10.1080/
03052150500420272
[16] Guikema, S.D.: Game theory models of intelligent actors in reliability
analysis: An overview of the state of the art. In: Game Theoretic
Risk Analysis of Security Threats, pp. 1–19. Springer US (2009). DOI
10.1007/978-0-387-87767-9
[17] Guikema, S.D., Aven, T.: Assessing risk from intelligent at-
tacks: A perspective on approaches. Reliability Engineering &
System Safety 95(5), 478–483 (2010). DOI DOI:10.1016/j.ress.
2009.12.001. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
B6V4T-4XY4JY2-1/2/4f7273aff7ad1c84a47c2277f405b92e
[18] Huang, J., Berry, R., Honig, M.: Auction–based Spectrum Sharing. ACM
Mobile Networks and Applications Journal 24(5), 405–418 (2006)
[19] Hurwicz, L.: Decision and Organization, chap. On informationally decen-
tralized systems, pp. pp. 297–336. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1972)
[20] Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J.N.: Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms.
Operations Research 57(4), 823–839 (2009). URL http://www.stanford.
edu/~rjohari/pubs/char.pdf
[21] John R. Hall, J.: The elephant in the room is called game theory. Risk
Analysis 29(8), 1061–1061 (2009). DOI 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01246.x
[22] Khalil, H.: Nonlinear Systems, 3rd edn. Prentice Hall (2002)
28
[23] Lazar, A.A., Semret, N.: The progressive second price auction mechanism
for network resource sharing. In: International Symposium on Dynamic
Games and Applications. Maastricht, Netherlands (1998)
[24] Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox, J.: Game theory and risk analysis. Risk Anal-
ysis 29(8), 1062–1068 (2009). DOI 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01247.x
[25] Maheswaran, R.T., Basar, T.: Social welfare of selfish agents: motivating
efficiency for divisible resources. In: 43rd IEEE Conf. on Decision and
Control (CDC), vol. 2, pp. 1550– 1555. Paradise Island, Bahamas (2004)
[26] Maskin, E.: Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Review of Economic
Studies 66(1), 23 – 38 (2003). DOI 10.1111/1467-937X.00076
[27] Miura-Ko, R.A., Yolken, B., Bambos, N., Mitchell, J.: Security investment
games of interdependent organizations. In: 46th Annual Allerton Confer-
ence (2008)
[28] Miura-Ko, R.A., Yolken, B., Mitchell, J., Bambos, N.: Security decision-
making among interdependent organizations. In: Proc. of 21st IEEE Com-
puter Security Foundations Symp. (CSF), pp. 66–80 (2008)
[29] Moore, D., Shannon, C., Claffy, K.: Code-Red: A case study on the spread
and victims of an Internet worm. In: Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM Workshop
on Internet Measurement, pp. 273–284. Marseille, France (2002)
[30] Mounzer, J., Alpcan, T., Bambos, N.: Dynamic control and mitigation
of interdependent IT security risks. In: Proc. of the IEEE Conference on
Communication (ICC). IEEE Communications Society (2010)
[31] Nash, J.F.: Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36(1), 48–
49 (1950). URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/88031
[32] Nash, J.F.: Non-cooperative games. The Annals of Mathematics 54(2),
286 – 295 (1951). URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1969529
[33] Rosen, J.B.: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave
n-person games. Econometrica 33(3), 520–534 (1965)
[34] Saad, W., Alpcan, T., Bas¸ar, T., Hjørungnes, A.: Coalitional game theory
for security risk management. In: Proc. of 5th Intl. Conf. on Internet
Monitoring and Protection (ICIMP). Barcelona, Spain (2010)
[35] Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjørungnes, A., Bas¸ar, T.: Coalitional
game theory for communication networks: A tutorial. IEEE Signal Pro-
cessing Mag., Special issue on Game Theory in Signal Processing and Com-
munications 26(5), 77–97 (2009)
[36] Srikant, R.: The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control. Systems &
Control: Foundations & Applications. Birkhauser, Boston, MA (2004)
29
[37] Wu, Y., Wang, B., Liu, K.J.R., Clancy, T.C.: Repeated open spectrum
sharing game with cheat–proof strategies. IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications 8(4), 1922–1933 (2009)
[38] Yang, S., Hajek, B.: VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible
goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals. IEEE JSAC
25(6), 1237–1243 (2007). DOI 10.1109/JSAC.2007.070817
30
